MiB Law

August 5, 2011August 15, 2012

Battery

The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that an actor commits a battery if:

He acts intending to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the person of the other or a third person, or an imminent apprehension of such a contact, and

A harmful [or offensive] contact with the person of the other directly or indirectly results

It is important to realize that the tortfeasor needs to intend to cause a harmful or offensive contact or an imminent apprehension of such contact. However, the tortfeasor does not need to intend the contact to the one who was actually harmed. If he intended the contact to a third person, yet injured a bystander, the tortfeasor may still be liable for battery.

What is harmful contact? Harmful contact causes pain or bodily damage. What is offensive contact? Offensive contact is said to occur when the contact “offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity.” Restatement (Second) of Torts § 19. The tortfeasor does not need to be aware that the contact is offensive.

Whenever you are analyzing battery make sure that you examine any defenses the tortfeasor might raise (i.e. consent). Upon proof of battery or assault, the plaintiff is entitled to recover nominal damages plus compensatory damages for bodily pain, humiliation, mental anguish and other injuries that occur as a necessary and natural consequence of the tortious conduct. Further, punitive damages should also be considered.

July 26, 2011

Disclaimer of Warranties

Disclaimers of Warranties (Section 316 of the Uniform Commercial Code).

Express Warranty

Express warranties are inoperative if the disclaimer cannot be construed as “consistent” with terms in the contract that would create the express warranty. You should the parol evidence to bar any express warranties that were created outside the document:

If it is an integrated agreement, then no warranties outside of the agreement are actually enforceable (parol evidence)

If it is not an integrated agreement, Apply Article 2, 316:

A disclaimer is only ineffective if it conflicts with the warranty

Therefore, you can have a disclaimer that limits the warranty but does not conflict it

Implied warranty of merchantability

Can also be disclaimed; however, the disclaimer has to mention merchantability. Furthermore, if it is in writing, the disclaimer has to be conspicuous (the disclaimer can be oral). In order to disclaim the implied warranty of mechantability, the disclaimer:

Cannot just state “all warranties are disclaimed”

Does not have to be in writing but must mention warranty of merchantability

Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose

Can also be disclaimed; but, the disclaimer must be in writing and must be conspicuous. The written disclaimer does not have to mention fitness. This implied warranty does not require a conspicuousness requirement, but most courts agree that one should be implied to carry out the section’s purpose of avoiding surprise to buyers.

Finally, it is important to note that an “As is” magically disclaims all warranties.

July 26, 2011

Express Warranties

Contract law has express warranties and implied warranties. Express Warranty is found in Section 313 of the Uniform Commercial Code. An express warranty is created as follows:

Any affirmation of fact or promise by the seller to the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirmation or promise
Any description of the goods which is made a part of the basis of the bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the description

To make it easier, you can just remember three elements that are needed to create an express warranty:

Statement regarding quality or description

Fact, promise, or description

Basis of the bargain

Implied Warranties

There are three implied warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 314 is the implied warranty of merchantability, section 315: warranty of fitness for a particular purpose and section 312: warranty of title. Most contracts courses will only focus on the first two. Here is what you need to know about them:

Implied warranty of merchantability

To be merchantable, the goods must be such as would “pass without objection in the trade” and as “are fit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used.”
In order to prove that a product is not merchantable, the complaining party must first establish the standard of merchantability in the trade.

Must first establish that the seller is a “merchant” with respect to the goods sold (regularly deals in goods of the kind or holds itself out as having particular knowledge about the kind of goods)

Implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose

To establish an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, the buyer must prove as a threshold matter that he made known to the seller the particular purpose for which the goods were required.
The elements to create an implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose:
1. Seller knows:
1. Buyer actually relies on the seller’s skill or judgment
The warranty is created only when the buyer relies on the seller’s skill or judgment to select suitable goods for the buyer’s particular purpose and the seller has reason to know of this reliance
Liability under this warranty is not limited to merchant sellers
Breach of the warranty does not require a showing that the goods are defective in any way – merely that the goods are not fit for the buyer’s particular purpose. (Most courts also hold that the buyer’s particular purpose must be one other than the ordinary use of the goods).

July 26, 2011

Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321 (1903)

Case Name: Champion v. Ames (U.S. Marshall)
Citation: 188 U.S. 321 (1903)

Key Facts: Congress enacted the Federal Lottery Act in 1895 , which prohibited the buying or selling of lottery tickets across state lines. Champion, was indicted for shipping lottery tickets from Texas to California. He challenged this on the grounds that the power to regulate commerce does not include the power to prohibit commerce of any item.

Holding: Upheld the federal law and rejected a 10th amendment challenge.

Reasoning: “Congress, for the purpose of guarding the people of the United States against the “widespread pestilence of lotteries” and to protect the commerce which concerns all the state, may prohibit the carrying of lottery tickets from one state to another.”

July 26, 2011

Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918)

Hammer v. Dagenhart (1918)
Citation: 247 U.S. 251 (1918)

Issue: Does Congress have the authority to regulate child labor by prohibiting the interstate transportation of products that were manufactured by children?

Facts: A father filed the initial action because Congress had passed an act which prohibited the interstate trade of goods that were manufactured by children.

Procedural History: A North Carolina Court ruled it was unconstitutional and the US Attorney General (Hammer) appealed to the Supreme Court.

Holding: Production is over once the products are offered for shipment which would put them into interstate commerce. Further, the fact that the products were “intended for interstate commerce transportation does not make their production subject to federal control under the commerce power.”

Additional Contention and Answer: It was further contended that the allowance of child labor in one state was unfair because it put other states that did not allow child labor at a disadvantage. “There is no power vested in Congress to require the states to exercise their police power so as to prevent possible unfair competition….The commerce clause was not intended to give to Congress a general authority to equalize such conditions.”

Holding: Congress does not have the authority to regulate child labor in North Carolina.

Dissent (Holmes): The statute confines itself to prohibiting the shipment of goods in interstate and foreign commerce that were created by children. This is interstate commerce and Congress is given the power to regulate such commerce.

July 26, 2011July 26, 2011

A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 US 495 (1935)

Case Name: A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States
Citation: 295 U.S. 495 (1935)

Issue: Whether Congress can regulate as regarding the slaughtering and selling by defendants which was solely in New York.

Facts: Schechter is a chicken slaughterhouse in New York. Almost all the poultry coming to New York is sent from other states. Schechter was convicted on eighteen counts for violating the “Live Poultry Code.”

This Code required sellers to sell only entire coops or half-coops of chickens and made it illegal for buyers to reject individual chickens as well as regulated employment (collective bargaining, prohibiting child labor, 40-hour work week, and minimum wage). Came out of the National Industrial Recovery Act.

Holding: Congress cannot regulate this because Schechter’s activities only occur in New York and only has an in-direct impact on interstate commerce.

Reasoning: The interstate commerce ended once the defendants purchased the chickens and took them to their slaughterhouse. The flow in interstate commerce (or “stream of commerce”) had ceased.

July 26, 2011

Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914)

Case Name: Houston, East & West Texas Railway Co. v. United States
Citation: 234 U.S. 342 (1914)

Issue: Whether Congress can regulate pricing of a rail line completely within the borders of Texas in order to protect fair competition in interstate commerce.

Facts: Shreveport competed with Dallas for shipments from East Texas, but the skewed price structure (mandated by the Texas Railroad Commission), greatly favored shipments to and from Dallas over Shreveport. The Interstate Commerce Commission, acting on a complaint from the Railroad Commission of Louisiana, found that “an unlawful and undue preference and advantage” was thereby given to the Texas cities, ordered the company to change the rate structure to end discriminatory pricing.

In effect, the Interstate Commerce Commission was attempting to set the rate that the railroad could charge from Dallas to Marshall, a section of rail line completely within the borders of Texas. The railroads argued that “Congress is impotent to control the intrastate charges of an interstate carrier.”

Holding: Congressional authority “necessarily embraces the right to control… operations in all matters having a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic, to the efficiency of interstate service, and to the maintenance of conditions under which interstate commerce may be conducted upon fair terms.” In other words, the Court allowed Congress to regulate intrastate transactions because of their impact on interstate commerce.

Reasoning: “Congress does possess the power to foster and protect interstate commerce, and to take all measures necessary or appropriate to that end, although intrastate transactions of interstate carriers may thereby be controlled.”

July 26, 2011

Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008)

Case Name: Boumediene v. Bush
Citation: 553 U.S. 723

Issue: Whether aliens have the constitutional privilege of habeas corpus and if Congress acted in violation of the Suspension Clause by seeking to eliminate their right of habeas corpus.

Key Facts: Aliens designated as enemy combatants being detained at Guantanamo Bay. All of these aliens are not citizens of nations that the US is at war with (see AUMF). While the aliens had pending appeals, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005 (DTA) which stated, “no court, justice, or judge shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider…an application for writ of habeas corpus filed by or on behalf of an alien detained by the Department of Defense at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.” Also, that the District of Columbia Circuit Court shall have “exclusive” jurisdiction to review decisions of the CSRTs.

The Court held in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that this did not apply to cases pending when the DTA was enacted. Congress responded by passing the Military Commissions Act (MCA) which stated no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any other action against the US relating to any aspect of the detention of an alien (pending on or after the date of enactment of this Act).

Analysis: If Congress intends to suspend the right, an adequate substitute must offer the prisoner a meaningful opportunity to demonstrate he is held pursuant to an erroneous application or interpretation of relevant law, and the reviewing decision-making must have some ability to correct errors, to assess the sufficiency of the government’s evidence, and to consider relevant exculpating evidence. Furthermore, the DTA failed to provide an adequate alternative to habeas corpus.

Holding: Aliens do have the habeas corpus privilege.

July 26, 2011July 26, 2011

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004)

Case Name: Hamdi v. Rumsfeld
Citation: 542 U.S. 507 (2004)

Issue: What process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his enemy-combatant status?

Key Facts: Citizen designated as an enemy combatant being held indefinitely at Guantanamo Bay. The habeas petition states only that “when seized by the United States Government, Mr. Hamdi resided in Afghanistan.” The Mathews calculus then contemplates a judicious balancing of these concerns, through an analysis of “the risk of an erroneous deprivation” of the private interest if the process were reduced and the “probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards.”

“Enemy Combatant” – “part of or supporting forces hostile to the United States or coalition partners” in Afghanistan and who “engaged in an armed conflict against the United States” there.

Petitioner’s argument: Hamdi contends: 18.U.S.C 4001(a) No citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of Congress.

Respondent’s argument: The Government contends: 4001(a) is satisfied because Hamdi is being detained “pursuant to an Act of Congress” [Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF)]. The Court said this was correct.

Analysis: “History and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat…We necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such circumstances.”

Holding: A citizen-detainee seeking to challenge his classification as an enemy combatant must receive notice of the factual basis for his classification, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before a neutral decision maker.

Decision 2: Concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment. Disagreed that his detention is authorized by an Act of Congress (Authorization for Use of Military Force) to satisfy 4001(a). Believed Hamdi should be released.

Scalia’s dissent: It is beyond the Court’s compass to determine whether detention and interrogation, in order to meet the Government’s security needs, are sufficient. Therefore, it is up to Congress and the Executive (elected officials).

Thomas’ dissent: The Federal Government’s war power cannot be balanced by the Court. The detention of Hamdi does not violate the Constitution. In other words, the loss of one man’s liberty is a low cost for national security.