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Durham v. State, 199 Ind. 567 (1927)

Case Name: Durham v. State
Citation: 199 Ind. 567 (1927)

Facts: Durham, the defendant and a deputy game warren, tried to arrest Long for illegal fishing. Long resisted, tried to flee, and beat Durham with an oar to get away. Durham then shot Long. Durham was convicted of assault and battery.

State’s argument: To adopt a rule that a state official cannot use extreme force to capture a misdemeanant would render the state powerless and permit misdemeanants to “stay the power of the state by unlawful resistance.”

Defendant’s argument: An officer may use force that is reasonably necessary to accomplish the arrest of a misdemeanant but cannot kill or inflict great bodily harm just for the purpose of effecting the arrest.

Holding: The judgment is reversed with a new trial.

Reasoning: To not allow a state officer to use force in arresting, even a misdemeanant, will say to defendant’s, “You may measure strength with the arresting officer, and avoid being taken if you are the stronger.” In other words, the court does not want to elevate brute force to a position of command over the wheels of justice.

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People v. Goetz, 68 NY 2d 96 (1986)

Case Name: People v. Goetz
Citation: 68 NY 2d 96 (1986)

Facts: Goetz was indicted on attempted murder, assault, and other charges for having shot and wounded four youths on a New York City subway train. The youths had approached Goetz and asked him for $5. Goetz had previously been mugged on the subway and believed these youths were going to mug him. The defendant then shot all four of the youths from left to right with his unlicensed pistol. The fifth bullet in the gun he used on one of the boys who “seem[ed] to be all right” so Goetz gave him “another.” None of the youths died but the boy who was shot twice was left paralyzed and with brain damage.

State’s argument: In evaluating the defendant’s self defense claim, the question is whether the defendant’s conduct was that of a reasonable man in the defendant’s situation.

Defendant’s argument: The use of the phrase “reasonably believes” in the penal code means that the analysis is from the point of view of the defendant and whether he reasonably believed he needed to act in self defense.

Holding: The state’s reading of the statute is proper.

Reasoning: The use of the word “reasonable” before belief shows that the drafters wanted to adopt an objective standard. The defendant’s own perceptions could completely exonerate him from any criminal liability.

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State v. Hayes, 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891)

Case Name: State v. Hayes
Citation: 105 Mo. 76, 16 S.W. 514 (1891)

Facts: Hayes, the defendant, proposed to Hill to rob a general store. The store was owned by Hill’s relatives but Hill agreed in order to entrap Hayes. Hayes opened up the window and Hill climbed in, handed Hayes a side of bacon. Hayes was then arrested.

State’s argument: Hayes was guilty of burglary because he, with a felonious intent, assisted and aided Hill to enter the building.

Defendant’s argument: Hayes cannot be guilty of the act of Hill because Hill’s act was not criminal. Hill did not enter the store with intent to steal and therefore, Hill did not commit a crime.

Holding: Judgment was reversed and remanded for a new trial on a count of petit larceny for “taking and removing the bacon after it was handed to him.”

Reasoning: The intent of the conspirators matters. “To make defendant responsible for the acts of Hill, they must have had a common motive and common design.”

The Common Law required mutuality or the same mens rea. Under the Model Penal Code (MPC), both parties do not need the same mens rea. Therefore, Hayes could be convicted under the MPC.

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Pinkerton v. United States, 328 US 640 (1946)

Case Name: Pinkerton v. United States
Citation: 328 US 640 (1946)

Facts: Defendant, Daniel Pinkerton, was convicted on substantive counts that his brother, Walter committed through conspiracy. The crimes were for violations of the Internal Revenue Code (“dealing in whiskey” according to the dissent). Walter committed many of the crimes when Daniel was in prison.

State’s argument: Daniel Pinkerton can be found guilty on the substantive counts if it was found at the time of the offenses, both defendants were parties to an unlawful conspiracy and the substantive offenses were in fact committed in furtherance of it.

Defendant’s argument: In addition to evidence that the offense was committed in furtherance of the conspiracy, the state must introduce evidence of direct participation in the commission of the substantive offense or other evidence from which participation might fairly be inferred was necessary.

Reasoning: Pinkerton joined in the unlawful scheme and there was no evidence that he had disavowed or defeated the purpose of the conspiracy.

Dissent: There was no evidence that Daniel participated in, aided or abetted Water in committing the substantive crimes. Also, if the court requires an action by the defendant to show withdrawal from the conspiracy, shouldn’t going to prison be enough?

 

Pinkerton doctrine: A defendant who is guilty of conspiring to commit one offense may be convicted of other offenses that his co-conspirators commit in furtherance of the conspiracy, as long as those other offenses are reasonably foreseeable consequences of the conspiratorial agreement.

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State v. Guthrie, 194 W. Va 657 (1995)

Case Name: State v. Guthrie
Citation: 194 W. Va 657 (1995)

Facts: Guthrie was convicted of first-degree murder and received a life sentence. Guthrie killed his co-worker after he was teased and whipped with a towel. Guthrie removed a knife from his pocked and stabbed the victim in the neck and as he fell, the arm. Guthrie had documented psychiatric problems including: two daily panic attacks, chronic depression, and an obsession with his nose (body dysmorphic disorder). Guthrie testified that he suffered a panic attack immediately preceding the stabbing.

Defendant’s argument: The jury instructions equated the terms “willful, deliberate, and premeditated” with “an intent to kill.” What is the point of having all of these different words if they all mean the same thing?

State’s argument: Premeditation can occur instantaneously and deliberation is only required for a moment. “No time is too short for the necessary premeditation to occur.” See Commonwelath v. Carroll.

Holding: Reversed and remanded for a new trial.

Reasoning: The jury instructions do not inform the jury of the difference between first- and second-degree murder. “To allow the State to prove premeditation…by only showing that the intention came into existence for the first time at the time of such killing completely eliminate the distinction between the two degrees of murder.” An elaborate plan or scheme to take life is not required, but the notion of instantaneous premeditation and momentary deliberation is not satisfactory for proof of first-degree murder.

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Commonwealth v. Carroll, 412 Pa. 525 (1963)

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Carroll
Citation: 412 Pa. 525 (1963)

Facts: Carroll was found guilty of first-degree murder for shooting his wife twice in the head. On appeal, Carroll raised the issue that the evidence could only sustain a conviction of second-degree murder. Some of the facts: Carroll served in the military and was constantly away from home. He took leave to be with his family. His wife had “sadistically” disciplined their children at times. The night of the murder Carroll and his wife argued for hours over a new job opportunity that would require Carroll to be away from home for four nights a week. Carroll’s wife said that she would leave him. There was a loaded gun on their window sill and Carroll shot her when she had fallen asleep.

Defendant’s argument:

  1. There was insufficient time for premeditation in the light Carroll’s good reputation.
  2. The time and place of the crime and the enormous difficulty of removing and concealing the body show an obvious lack of premeditation.
  3. Also,Carroll did not have the requisite premeditation based on a psychiatrist’s opinion. The psychiatrist stated that Carroll was dependant on his wife, he didn’t want her to leave, and that “rage,” “desperation,” and “panic” produced an impulsive automatic reflex type of homicide…as opposed to an intentional premeditated type of homicide.

State’s argument: No time is too short for the necessary premeditation to occur. The space of time between the premeditation and the fatal act is immaterial if the killing was in fact intentional, willful, deliberate and premeditated. Also, we do not have to believe everything a psychiatric says.

Holding: Judgment and sentence affirmed.

Reasoning: Society would be almost completely unprotected from criminals if the law permitted a blind or irresistible impulse or inability to control one’s self, to excuse or justify a murder or to reduce if from first to second degree.

Compare this to State v. Guthrie which provides different interpretation of premeditation

 

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People v. Arzon, 401 NYS 2d 156 (1978)

Case Name: People v. Arzon
Citation: 401 NYS 2d 156

Facts: Arzon was indicted for two counts of murder in the second degree after intentionally setting fire to a couch and a fireman was killed. The fireman was “enveloped by a dense smoke,” which was later discovered to have arisen from another independent fire (an independent intervening cause) that had broken out on the second floor. There was virtually no evidence implicating Arzon in the second fire’s responsibility (although it did originate in arson).

Defendant’s argument: The evidence was insufficient to support Arzon’s murder charge because murder requires a causal link between the underlying crime and the death.

State’s argument: “It is not necessary that the ultimate harm be intended by the actor. It will suffice if it can be said, beyond a reasonable doubt, as indeed it can here be said, that the ultimate harm is something which should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the acts of the accused.”

Holding: Arzon’s motion to dismiss the murder counts was denied.

Reasoning: The Court looked at foreseeability after it determined that the defendant’s conduct was foreseeable. It was foreseeable that firemen would respond to the situation, thus exposing them, to a life-threatening danger. The fire set by Arzon was an indispensable link in the chain of events that resulted in the death. The first and second fire were concurrent causes to the same result.

Compare to People v. Warner-Lambert Co.

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People v. Warner-Lambert Co., 51 N.Y.2d 295 (1980)

Case Name: People v. Warner-Lambert Co.
Citation: 51 N.Y.2d 295 (1980)

Facts: Warner-Lambert Co. and its officers/employees were indicted for second-degree manslaughter and criminally negligent homicide. A massive explosion at the corporation’s chewing-gum factory killed and injured employees. Warner-Lambert Co. used two potentially explosive substances (magnesium stearate and liquid nitrogen) and had been warned by their insurance carrier that there was an explosion harzard.

Defendant’s argument: There was no hard proof on what actually triggered the explosion but only speculations by experts that it could have been caused by the manufacturing process. Therefore, foreseeability was not established.

State’s argument: The but-for causation is all that is required for the imposition of criminal liability. There was evidence of a foreseen risk of explosion, the defendant’s failure to remove the risk, and an explosion actually occurring.

Holding: Indictment dismissed.

Reasoning: The defendants’ actions must be a sufficiently direct cause of the ensuing death before there can be any imposition of criminal liability. The court focuses on whether there was an actual cause. You must find the “actual cause” before you can establish “foreseeability.”

Compare to People v. Arzon

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People v. Acosta, 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1991)

Case Name: People v. Acosta
Citation: 284 Cal. Rptr. 117 (1991)

Facts: Two police helicopters crashed, killing three occupants, during a chase of the defendant, Acosta. One of the helicopter pilots violated FAA regulations during the chase.

Defendant’s argument: The helicopter pilot’s FAA violations were a superseding cause of the accident.  Also, it was unforeseeable (highly extraordinary) for a mid-air helicopter crash because the FAA inspector that testified had never heard of one and there was no civil or criminal cases involving a two-helicopter collision.

State’s argument: Acosta’s actions were the actual (“but-for”) cause of the helicopter crash. The proximate cause requirement was fulfilled because it was foreseeable or “a possible consequence which reasonably might have been contemplated.”

Holding: Acosta was the proximate cause but the judgment was reversed because there was insufficient evidence of malice.

Reasoning: The proximate cause requirement was fulfilled because it was foreseeable or “a possible consequence which reasonably might have been contemplated.” That no pursuits have ever before resulted in a helicopter crash or midair collision is more a comment on police flying skill and technology than upon the innate probabilities involved.

Dissent: The intervening negligent conduct (of the helicopter pilot) and the risk of harm were not foreseeable; therefore, the law does not assign blame. The dissent then quoted Cardozo in Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co (1928) and stated that the helicopters were not in the “zone of danger.” (Dissent is incorrect because the trier of fact also looks to see if there is a sufficient relationship that the law is justified in imposing liability)

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People v. Evans, 85 Misc. 2d 1088 (1975)

Case Name: People v. Evans
Citation: 85 Misc. 2d 1088 (1975)

Facts: Evans used psychological techniques on a vulnerable college girl. The testimony showed that Evans was a predator and that the girl was naïve and gullible. When Evans had the girl alone in his apartment he said “I could kill you. I could rape you. I could hurt you physically.” The girl was frightened but the sexual intercourse was seemingly consensual and there was no showing of force.

Issue: Whether we should view the controlling state of mind from the point of view of the person who hears the words and interprets them as a threat or the state of mind of the person who utters such words.

Defendant’s argument: Evan’s words meant that the girl was foolish but does not show that he would have used force if the girl did not submit. Seduction is not a crime.

State’s argument: Evan’s words were intended for the girl to do what he said or else he would use force.

Holding: Not guilty because the court cannot find forcible compulsion or threat beyond a reasonable doubt.

Reasoning: The controlling state of mind should be from the person who utters them because, this being a criminal trial, the criminal intent of the defendant must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt. If the defendant did not intend a threat, then there is not the necessary criminal intent to establish culpability.