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Mullins v Parkview Hospital, Inc.

Case Name: Mullins v Parkview Hospital, Inc.
Plaintiff: Ruth Mullins
Defendant: Parkview Hospital, LeRea VanHoey, the anesthesiologist
Issue: Did VanHoey commit a battery as she had no reason to suspect that Mullins had insisted on modifying the standard consent form and that she could not rely on her preceptor’s direction and the doctor’s authority?

Key Facts: Ruth Mullins told her gynecologist that she wanted privacy during the surgery (writing contract). Once Mullins was unconscious, the anesthesiologist permitted an EMT student, VanHoey, to practice intubation on the plaintiff. This resulted in the laceration of Mullins’ esophagus.

Procedural History: The lower court granted summary judgment for all defendants on all counts but the Court of Appeals held that Mullins had an actionable battery claim against VanHoey, the gynecologist, the anesthesiologist and both doctors’ practices. VanHoey appealed.

Holding: VanHoey did not commit a battery as her actions did not satisfy all of the elements required to show battery. There is no evidence to show that VanHoey intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with the plaintiff.

Judgment: VanHoey was entitled to summary judgment on the battery claim. The high court affirmed the trial court’s decision and did not agree with the Court of Appeals.

Reasoning: VanHoey may have “touched Mrs. Mullins in a harmful and offensive manner without permission; however, this characterization does not satisfy all the elements required to show battery. The Mullinses must show that VanHoey intended to cause a harmful or offensive contact with Mullins.
VanHoey did not intend to cause a contact and also did not know with substantially certainty that her action would cause a harmful contact.

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Cohen v Smith

Case Name: Cohen v Smith
Plaintiff/Appellant: Cohen
Defendant/Appellee: Smith

Issue:  Whether the defendant committed a battery when he observed and touched the plaintiff’s naked body.

Key Facts: Patricia Cohen was admitted to the hospital to deliver her baby. Cohen was informed that it would be necessary for her to have a cesarean section. Cohen informed her physician, who informed the hospital staff, that due to her religious beliefs, Cohen could not be seen unclothed by a male. Cohen’s doctor assured her husband that their religious convictions would be respected. During the c-section, Smith, a male nurse, allegedly observed and touched Cohen’s naked body.

Procedural History: The trial court granted the defendants’ motions to dismiss.

Holding: The appellate court found that the trial court erred in dismissing both the battery and the intentional infliction of emotional distress counts.

Reasoning: In reviewing a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the court must view all well-pleaded facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Taking this into account, the defendant may have committed a battery by committing an offensive contact with the plaintiff. The result of the defendant’s intentional contact resulted in offending a reasonable sense of personal dignity by violating the plaintiff’s religious beliefs.

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Garratt v Dailey – Case Brief

Case Name: Garratt v Dailey
Plaintiff/Appellant: Ruth Garratt
Defendant/Appellee: Brian Dailey

Key Facts: Brian Daily, a five year old, was visiting the home of Ruth Garratt. Garratt contends that during the visit, Dailey deliberately pulled out a chair from under her as she started to sit down. Garratt fell to the ground and sustained a fracture of her hip and other injuries. There is a dispute in the facts, as Dailey claims that once he discovered Garratt was about to sit, he attempted to move the chair back under her.
The preponderance of the evidence in this case established that when Garratt moved the chair, he did not have any willful or unlawful purpose and that he did not have any intent to injure the plaintiff, or any intent to bring about unauthorized or offensive contact with her person.

Procedural History: The trial court stated that Garratt failed in her proof of the prima facie elements of battery and accepted Dailey’s version of the story and did not award Garratt damages. In other words, the court determined that the plaintiff had not established her theory of a battery.

Issue: Whether Dailey had the requisite intent to commit a battery when he pulled out the chair from under Garratt.

Holding: A battery would be established if it was proved that when Dailey moved the chair he knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been.

Reasoning: Dailey, whether five or fifty-five, must have committed some wrongful act before he could be liable for appellant’s injuries. However, clarification should be conducted to cover the question of Dailey’s knowledge, because intent could be inferred from his knowledge.

Judgment: The appellate court remanded the case back to the trial court to discover whether Dailey knew with substantial certainty that the plaintiff would attempt to sit down where the chair had been.

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Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. American Ash Recycling Corp. of Pennsylvania

Case Name: Pennsy Supply, Inc. v. American Ash Recycling Corp. of Pennsylvania
Citation: Pennsylvania Superior Court; 895 A.2d 595 (2006)
Plaintiff/Appellant: Pennsy Supply, Inc.
Defendant/Appellee: American Ash Recycling Corp. of Pennsylvania

Issue: Whether consideration existed in the contract between the plaintiff and defendant when defendant allegedly avoided disposal costs by supplying plaintiff materials at no cost.

Key Facts: The plaintiff had secured a subcontractor job for the paving of driveways and parking lots. The project specifications included a notice of availability of a material known as AggRite that could be used for base aggregates and was available at no cost from the defendant. The plaintiff contacted the defendant, informed them on the amount it needed, picked it up, and used it for the paving work. Two months after the paving work was completed, there were substantial defects in the pavement and the plaintiff had to perform remedial work which cost the plaintiff $250,000. Furthermore, it incurred an additional $133,000 to dispose of the AggRite it had received from the defendant. The plaintiff filed a five-count complaint alleging (1) breach of contract, (2) breach of implied warranty of merchantability, (3) breach of express warranty of merchantability, (4) breach of warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, (5) promissory estoppel.

Procedural History: The defendant filed demurrers to all five counts and the trial court sustained the demurrers and dismissed the complaint. The trial court believed the defendant only made a conditional gift to the plaintiff and therefore the contract did not have consideration. They stated that the disposal costs were a mere condition of the defendant’s gift.

Holding: The trial court erred in its dismissal because if the alleged facts are proven, it would show consideration because the promise induced the detriment of incurring disposal costs and the detriment of those disposal costs induced the promise from the defendant.

Reasoning: If the complaint is true that the defendant “actively promotes the use of AggRite as a building material” to be used for purposes the plaintiff was engaging in, then by the defendant providing the materials free of charge, they are seeking others to dispose of the material in order to avoid incurring the disposal costs itself. The material provided by the defendant saved the defendant thousands of dollars in disposal costs it otherwise would have incurred.
The Superior Court also examined whether consideration is lacking because the plaintiff did not allege (or understand) the defendant’s avoidance of disposal costs during the bargaining process between the parties. The court did not believe this was necessary because for consideration to exist “the promise and the consideration be in “the relation of reciprocal conventional inducement, each for the other”” (O. Holmes).

Judgment: The Superior Court reversed the trial court’s decision of dismissing the Complaint and remanded it back to the trial court for further proceedings.

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Uston v Resorts International Hotel, Inc. – 445 A.2d 370 (1982)

Case Name: Uston v Resorts International Hotel, Inc.
Citation: 445 A.2d 370 (1982)
Plaintiff: Uston
Defendant: Resorts International Hotel, Inc.

Key Facts: Defendant was excluded Uston from the blackjack tables in its casino because Uston uses a card counting strategy which allegedly increases his chances of winning money. His strategy does not violate the Casino Control Commission.

Issue: Does the right of reasonable access apply to all businesses that are open to the public?

Holding: Uston possesses the right of reasonable access to the blackjack’s tables; unless there is a valid rule by the Commission that would state otherwise.

Reasoning: Uston does not threaten the security of the casino nor has he disrupted its functions and there is no common or statutory law that could exclude him because of his strategy to play blackjack.
“The more private property is dedicated to public use, the more it must accommodate the rights which inhere in individual members of the general public who use that property.” State v. Schmid. Schmid involved the constitutional right to distribute literature on a private university campus. The court decided that when property owners open up their property to the general public, for their own private property interests, they have no right to exclude people unreasonably.
The traditional common law right of reasonable access had only applied to innkeepers and common carriers (planes, trains, buses). Uston extended that law to all businesses open to the public.

Judgment: Uston was allowed use of the blackjack tables.

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Glavin v Eckman – 881 N.E. 2d 820

Case Name: Glavin v Eckman
Citation:  881 N.E. 2d 820 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008)
Plaintiff: James A. Glavin
Defendant: Bruce and Shelly Eckman; Jon R. Fragosa

Issue: Whether the judge erred in permitting the jury to award a restoration cost measure of damages, rather than damages measured by the value of the timber wrongfully cut, or by the diminutive market value.

Key Facts: The defendants (Eckmans) hired an independent contractor (Fragosa) to cut down ten oak trees that were on the property the plaintiff (Glavin) , without his permission, in order to enhance their view. Glavin had previously been asked by Eckman to have this done but refused to and stated that he planned to use the ten oak trees as shade for a pond which he planned to restore.

Procedural History: The jury awarded Glavin $30,000 to restore his land. They found that both Eckman and Fragosa were at fault.

Holding: According to Mass. Gen Law statute, Glavin was able to opt for the value of the timber cut or the diminutive value of his property as the measure of damages. However, if this does not meet the value of the damages, he may opt for restorative damages.

Reasoning: Glavin was not planning on selling the land so diminutive market value should not be the main measure of damages. The trees had significant value to Glavin. Direct restoration may be physically impossible or disproportionally expensive that it be unreasonable to do so.

Judgment: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award to Glavin of $30,000.

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State v. Shack – 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971)

Case Name: State v. Shack
Citation: 277 A.2d 369 (N.J. 1971)
Appellant: Tejeras and Shack
Appellee: State

Issue: Do real property rights, specifically the trespass statute or right to exclude, supersede the fundamental rights of an individual?

Key Facts: Defendants entered the private property of Tedesco to aid migrant farm workers who were employed and housed on his property. Both defendants work for nonprofit organizations that provide health (Tejeras) and legal (Shack) services to migrant workers. The defendants were confronted by Tedesco who inquired of their purpose. Tedesco offered to locate the specific migrant workers that the defendants were seeking but required that any consultation must take place in his office and in his presence. The defendants declined his terms and Tedesco summoned a State Trooper to have the defendants removed from his property.

Procedural History: Defendants were convicted in the Municipal Court of Deerfield Township for trespassing (criminal).

Holding: The appellate court found that the defendants did not violate any property rights of the farmer-employer and that there conduct went beyond the reach of the trespass statute.

Reasoning: Being mindful of the employer’s interest in his and his employees’ security, the employer may require a visitor to identify himself and state his general purpose. However, the employer cannot deny the worker his right to privacy or interfere with his opportunity to live with dignity and other customary benefits among citizens. These basic rights are too fundamental to be denied by property rights and too fragile to be left to the unequal bargaining strength of the parties.

Judgment: The county court’s finding was reversed and the appellate court remanded to the county court so that the defendants could be acquitted.

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Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice – 934 P.2d 1313 (1997)

Case Name: Alaska Democratic Party v. Rice
Citation: 934 P.2d 1313 (1997)
Plaintiff/Appellee: Kathleen Rice
Defendant/Appellant: Greg Wakefield and Alaska Democratic Party

Issue: Whether the doctrine of promissory estoppel can be invoked to enforce an oral contract that falls within the Statute of Frauds.

Key Facts: Ms. Rice contended that Mr. Wakefield (the chair-elect of the Alaska Democratic Party) offered her a two-year position as executive director of the party. Because of this offer she quit her current employment and moved from Maryland to Alaska.
No written contract was entered into between Rice and the defendants.
Rice brought two claims: (1) promissory estoppel and (2) misrepresentation

Procedural Posture: The jury awarded a total of $30,422 ($28,864 on her promissory estoppel claim and $1,558 on her misrepresentation claim)

Reasoning: “The purpose of the Statute of Frauds is to prevent fraud by requiring that certain categories of contracts be reduced to writing. However, it is not intended as an escape route for persons seeking to avoid obligations undertaken by or imposed upon them.”

Judgment: The court affirmed the claims but reduced the recovery to $28,864 – the amount that represents only lost wages and benefits.

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Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Electric Co. – 143 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 1998)

Case Name: Princess Cruises, Inc. v. General Electric Co.
Citation: 143 F.3d 828 (4th Cir. 1998)
Plaintiff/Appellee: Princess Cruises, Inc.
Defendant/Appellant: General Electric Co.

Issue: Whether the district court erred in applying the UCC to the contract and whether the jury erred in their award by not observing GE’s final price quotation.

Key Facts: The plaintiff submitted a purchase order (intended to be an offer) to the defendant to perform routine inspection services and repairs on one of its cruise ships. The defendant faxed back its own Fixed Price Quotation which had other terms and disclaimed any liability for consequential damages, lost profits, or lost revenue.
During the inspection, the defendant recommended that the ship be taken ashore for cleaning and balancing. During the cleaning the rotor became unbalanced, which the defendant attempted to correct. The imbalance caused further damage to the ship forcing additional repairs and the cancellation of two tend-day cruises. The plaintiff paid the defendant the full amount of the contract ($231,925).

Procedural History: A jury found GE liable for breach of contract and awarded the plaintiff $4.5 million in damages. Appealing, GE contends that the district court erred in denying its motion for judgment which required the court to vacate the jury’s award of incidental and consequential damages. GE argues that the district court erred because it applied UCC principles, rather than common-law, to a contract primarily for services.

Holding: The contract should not have been evaluated under the UCC because it was a contract for services and the jury should have only considered GE’s Final Price Quotation which restricted damages to the contract price and eliminated liability for incidental or consequential damages, lost profits, or revenue.

Reasoning: First, whether a particular transaction is governed by the UCC, rather than common or statutory law, hinges on whether the contract primarily concerns the furnishing of goods or the rendering of services. Princess’s actual purchase description requests a GE “service engineer” to perform service functions (the contract included incidental parts that were expensive).
Second, the jury should have only considered GE’s Final Price Quotation as the contract. The first purchase order submitted by Princess was rejected by a counteroffer (GE’s first price quotation) which in turn, was revoked and replaced by another offer (GE’s Final Price Quotation. Also, because Princess failed to discuss the conflicting terms of the two contracts, their inaction gave GE every reason to believe that Princess assented to the terms set forth in their final price quotation.

Restatement 19 – “The manifestation of assent may be made wholly or partly by written or spoken words or by other acts or by failure to act.” Under the Restatement, a counter-offer destroys the offer.  The fact that the parties performed evidence that there was an acceptance. The phone call giving GE permission to proceed and that Princess brought their ship in to be repaired. Therefore, Princess intended to accept the last counter-offer by GE. This is called the last-shot rule. Whatever is left on the table is the contract. The only one that really matters is the last contract on the table. If the parties perform, then there is an acceptance.

Judgment: The circuit court reversed the district court’s decision and granted GE’s motion for judgment as a matter of law and remanded to modify the judgment according to common-law and the opinion of the court.

Why it was important to determine whether common law or the UCC applied: Common law only gives us two options in contract formation: Offer and Acceptance or Counteroffer. The UCC gives us a third option: acceptance with additional terms.

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Brown Machine, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc. – 770 S.W.2d 416 (1989)

Case name: Brown Machine, Inc. v. Hercules, Inc.
Citation: 770 S.W.2d 416 (1989)
Plaintiff: Brown Machine, Inc.
Defendant: Hercules, Inc.

Issue: Whether the parties had agreed to an indemnification provision in their contract.

Key Facts: The plaintiff, Brown Machine, sold the defendant, Hercules, a T-100 trim press. Prior to the sale, a proposal was submitted to the defendant which stated an indemnification clause. The defendant reviewed the proposal and spoke on the phone with the plaintiff but objected to the payment term in the proposal. The plaintiff contested that the proposal was an offer and this conversation was an acceptance.
The defendant then submitted a purchase order (actual offer) for the trim press which stated that it “limits acceptance to the terms stated…any additional or different terms proposed by the seller are rejected unless expressly agreed to in writing.”
The plaintiff then sent the defendant an order acknowledgement which again stated the indemnification clause. The defendant responded with a latter that stated a specification in the product needed to be changed but “all other specifications are correct.” The plaintiff contended that this constituted assent by the defendant to the indemnification clause but the judge said it was obvious that “specifications” only referred to the product and not the terms and conditions.

Procedural History: The trial court awarded the plaintiff for the defendant violating the indemnification provision.

Analysis: If this was common law, we would use the last shot rule. However, under the UCC we use acceptance with additional terms (Section 2-207).

Holding: The parties had not agreed to an indemnification provision.

Judgment: The court reversed the trial court’s decision.

See our helpful UCC 2-207 Flowchart