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Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co. – 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948)

Case Name: Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co.
Plaintiff: Eliff
Defendant: Texon Drilling Co.
Citation: 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948)

Issue: Whether under the law of capture the plaintiff can recover for the damages resulting from the wrongful drainage of the gas from beneath their land.

Key Facts: The landowners owned the surface and certain royalty interest of land upon which a producing well was located, as well as the mineral estate underlying the land. While the oil companies were engaged in drilling an offset well, the offset well blew out, caught fire, and cratered. The blowout resulted in the destruction of the landowners’ well and drained large quantities of gas and distillate from under their land. The landowners filed suit.

Applicable Law: In Texas, the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath the land. However, this law must be in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police regulations. Scientific research has determined that oil and gas will migrate across property lines towards any low pressure area created by production from the common pool.

This migratory character of oil and gas has given rise to the so-called rule or law of capture. That rule simply is that the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from wells on his land, though part of the oil or gas may have migrated from adjoining lands. He does not need consent and does not incur liability. The nonliability is based upon the theory that after the drainage the title or property interest of the former owned is gone. Each owner whose land overlies the basin has a like interest, and each must of necessity exercise his right with some regard to the rights of others. No owner should be permitted to carry on his operations in reckless or lawless irresponsibility, but must submit to such limitations as are necessary to enable each to get his own.

The court did not think the non-liability rule should apply to negligent waste and destruction of the oil.

Procedural Posture: Petitioner land owners appealed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals (Texas), which reversed the trial court’s judgment for the land owners in their action to recover damages resulting from a blowout of a gas well drilled by respondent oil companies.

Overview: The trial court entered judgment for the landowners. The appellate court reversed the judgment, and this appeal followed. The court reversed the appellate court’s judgment. The appellate court was without authority to pass upon the propriety of the measure of damages adopted by the trial court because no such assignment was presented to it. The law of capture did not absolve the oil companies from liability because the negligent waste and destruction of the landowners’ gas and distillate was neither a legitimate drainage nor a lawful or reasonable appropriation of them. Under the common law, the oil companies were legally bound to use due care to avoid the negligent waste or destruction of the minerals, and they failed to discharge this duty.

Judgment: The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and the case was remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings.

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Popov v. Hayashi – 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002)

Case Name: Popov v. Hayashi
Plaintiff: Popov
Defendant: Hayashi
Citation: 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002)

Issue: Whether the defendant is liable for conversion when he picked up the home run ball that was dropped by the plaintiff.

Key Facts: Barry Bonds 73rd Homerun. The plaintiff caught the ball in the upper portion of his glove but was tackled and thrown to the ground by the crowd. The ball fell out and the defendant picked it up and put it in his pocket. The plaintiff sued for conversion.

Holding: The plaintiff and defendant had equitable claims and could not prove their case either way.

Reasoning: Although the plaintiff proved intent to possess the ball, he could not establish that he would have fully possessed the ball had he not been tackled by the crowd. If he could have established this, his pre-possessory interest would have constituted a qualified right to possession which can support a cause of action for conversion.

Judgment: The ball was sold for $450,000 and the proceeds were divided equally.

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Pierson v. Post – 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805)

Case Name: Pierson v. Post
Plaintiff/Appellee: Post
Defendant/Appellant: Pierson
Citation: 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805)

Issue: Whether a trespass was committed when Pierson killed and carried off the fox that was being hunted by Post.

Key Facts: Post was hunting a fox with dogs and hounds and while he was hunting the fox, Pierson, who knew that Post was hunting, killed and carried off the fox.

Procedural History: The first court found for the plaintiff, Post.

Holding: A trespass was not committed although the conduct of Pierson was uncourteous towards Post, his act did not produce an injury or damage for which a legal remedy can be applied.

Reasoning: Based off Barbeyrac, the actual bodily seizure is not necessary constitute possession of wild animals; however, pursuit alone is insufficient to constitute possession.

Judgment: The second court reversed the decision.

Dissent: The dissenting opinion stated that property in animals may be acquired without bodily touch or manucaption, provided the pursuer be within reach, or have a reasonable prospect of taking, what he has thus discovered an intention of converting to his own use.

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Willcox v. Stroup – 467 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2006)

Case Name: Willcox v. Stroup
Plaintiff: Thomas Law Willcox
Defendant: Stroup (Director of the SC Department of Archives/History and the State of South Carolina
Citation: 467 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2006)

Issue: Whether the plaintiff had good title of the Civil War documents when they had been in his family’s possession for over one hundred and forty years and there was no evidence that showed any other had title to the property.

Key Facts: The plaintiff found 444 documents from the administrations of two governors of South Carolina during the Civil War in a shopping bag in his late stepmother’s home. The documents have an appraised value of $2.4 million. The plaintiff allowed the documents to be microfilmed for the state archives. When the plaintiff attempted to sell the papers, the defendant obtained a temporary restraining order preventing the sale. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that he owned the papers.

Reasoning: If there is no evidence to the contrary, proof of possession, is sufficient proof of title.

Rule of Law: Proof of possession is sufficient proof of title if there is no evidence to the contrary.

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Bayliss v. Bayliss – 550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989)

Case Name: Bayliss v. Bayliss
Citation: 550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989)

Issue: Does a non-custodial parent have a legal obligation to pay for college expenses for their post-minority child?

  • Post-minority: over the age of 18 but still unable to support themselves.

Key Facts: Patrick Bayliss was the son of Cherry R. Bayliss and John Martin Bayliss III. The couple divorced when Patrick was 12 years old. When he was 18, his mother filed a petition to modify the final judgment of divorce to order her ex-husband to pay for Patrick’s college.

Holding:  Yes the court has a right to assure that the children of divorced parents, who are minors at the time of divorce, are given the same right to a college education before and after they reach the age of 19 years that they probably would have if their parents had not divorced.

Reasoning: In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or a modification of a divorce judgment, a trial court may award sums of money out of the property and income of either or both parents for the post-minority education of a child of that dissolved marriage, when application is made therefore, before the child attains the age of majority.
The trial court should consider factors including primarily the financial resources of the parents and the child and the child’s commitment to, and aptitude for, the requested education. The trial court also may consider, the standard of living that the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been dissolved and the family unit had been preserved and the child’s relationship with his parents and responsiveness to parental advice and guidance.

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International News Service v. Associated Press – 248 U.S. 215 (1918)

Case Name: International News Service v. Associated Press
Plaintiff: Associated Press
Defendant: International News Service
Citation: 248 U.S. 215 (1918)

Issue: Whether the plaintiff has a property right in the information it gathered for news.

Key Facts: INS was obtaining news that was gathered by the AP through public bulletin boards and early edition newspapers and then reproducing the news in their members’ newspapers without giving credit to the AP. Plaintiff contended that defendant’s practice constitutes unfair competition.
The AP contended that the news they gathered is property, because it costs money and labor to produce and because it has value for exchange. Also this news remains property and is entitled to protection as long as it has commercial value as news. The AP desired that the INS not be able to make any gainful use of their news while it retained its value as news.

Holding: Plaintiff does have a property right but it is limited and extends only against competitors in the news business.

Reasoning: Title to property is not absolute but relative. Because the news has “exchange value” based on its novelty and freshness, it should be protected as a property right with rules against misappropriation by a competitor.

Dissent: The dissenting opinion (Brandeis) did not believe news constituted property that could be protected. Also, that the defendant’s practices did not constitute unfair competition in the legal sense because the legal sense only addresses fraud or  force or doing of acts otherwise prohibited by law. The gathering of news by purchasing papers in the open market or from public bulletins did not involve breach of contract, fraud, or force. Also, the INS was under no contractual obligation to disclose the source of news and no law because the material was uncopyrighted.

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McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. – 210 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2000)

Case Name: McCann v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Plaintiff/Appellee: Debra McCann and her two children
Defendant/Appellant: Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.
Citation: 210 F.3d 51 (1st Cir. 2000)

Issue: Under Maine law, is the defendant liable for false imprisonment when it told the plaintiffs they must remain in the store until the police arrived.

Key Facts: As the plaintiffs were leaving Wal-Mart following a purchase, they were stopped by Wal-Mart employees who stated that the plaintiff’s child had previously stolen from the store and was not allowed in the store.  The plaintiff protested that they were mistaken but the employees insisted and told her that the police were being called and she “had to go with her.” The plaintiffs were told to remain by the store’s exit while they were supposedly waiting on the police. Only a security guard was summoned and when she arrived she testified that the child was not the shoplifter. The entire process lasted close to one hour.

Procedural History: The jury awarded the plaintiff $20,000 in compensatory damages for false imprisonment. The defendant appealed.

Holding: The defendant’s employees did false imprison the plaintiff because they intentionally confined the plaintiff within boundaries.

Rule of Law: False imprisonment occurs when a person confines another intentionally without lawful privilege and against his consent within a limited area for any appreciable time, however short.

Reasoning: Wal-Mart asserted that under Maine law, the jury had to find “actual physical restraint,” which it took from a case in 1915 because Maine’s highest court did not have a complete definition of false imprisonment. Although the defendant did not touch the plaintiff, the directions to the defendant, the reference to the police, and the continued presence of Wal-Mart employees were enough to induce reasonable people to believe either that they would be restrained physically if they sought to leave, or that the store was claiming lawful authority to confine them until the police arrived, or both.

Judgment: The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision. The jury did not have to find actual physical restraint.

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Cullison v. Medley – 570 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. 1991)

Case Name: Cullison v. Medley
Plaintiff/Appellant: Dan R. Cullison
Appellees/Defendant: The Medleys
Citation:  570 N.E.2d 27 (Ind. 1991)

Issue: Whether the defendants committed an assault against the plaintiff when they surrounded him in his trailer, had a holstered gun, and threatened him with bodily harm.

Key Facts: The plaintiff was approached in his living room by the five uninvited defendants. One of the defendants had a revolver in a holster strapped to his thigh. He was berated and was called a “pervert” and “sick.” The defendant never withdrew the gun from the holster but “kept grabbing at it with his hand, like he was going to take it out” and the plaintiff thought he was going to be shot by the defendant. As a result of the incidence, the plaintiff suffered chest pains and feared that he was having a heart attack. Additional instances occurred in which the plaintiff had more reason to believe he was in danger including that he learned one of the defendants had shot a man in the past.

Procedural History: The plaintiff sued for a number of torts, including assault. The trial court granted summary judgment on all claims. The Court of Appeals decided that it was not assault, because the defendant never removed his gun from the holster so his threat only constituted conditional language which did not express any present intent to harm. Plaintiff appealed.

Holding: The facts alleged by the plaintiff could entitle him to recover for an assault against the defendants as a jury could reasonably conclude that the defendants intended to frighten the plaintiff.

Rule of Law: The right to be free from the apprehension of imminent harm or offensive contact is protected by the tort of assault. An assault constitutes “a touching of the mind, if not the body.”

Reasoning: The plaintiff testified that he thought the defendant was going to shot him. Apprehension in the context of assault does not mean fear, but rather an awareness of imminent touching that would be a battery if completed. The plaintiff may have had an awareness of this imminent danger during his various encounters with the defendant.

Judgment: The case was remanded to the lower court to determine whether the plaintiff’s apprehension of being shot or otherwise injured was one which would normally be aroused in the mind of a reasonable person.

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White v. Muniz – 999 P.2d 814 (Colo. 2000)

Case Name: White v. Muniz
Citation: 999 P.2d 814 (Colo. 2000)

Key Facts: An elderly woman, Everly, who lives in an assisted living facility hits Muniz, a shift supervisor, while she is attempting to change her adult diaper. Everly was diagnosed with progressive dementia, loss of memory, impulse control and judgment, and Alzheimers. Muniz filed a complaint against Everly and White, Everly’s granddaughter, for assault and battery.

Issue: Whether an intentional tort requires some proof that the tortfeasor not only intended to contact another person, but also intended that the contact be harmful or offensive to the other person.

Holding: Colorado requires dual intent so they rejected the arguments of Muniz and affirmed the trial court. It was proper for the trial court to instruct the jury that Everly “must have appreciated the offensiveness of her conduct”

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Snyder v. Turk – 627 N.E. 2d 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)

Case Name: Snyder v Turk
Plaintiff/Appellant: Snyder
Defendant/Appellee: Dr. Turk
Citation: 627 N.E. 2d 1053 (Ohio Ct. App. 1993)


Issue: Did Dr. Turk intend to commit an offensive contact, and in turn commit battery, when he grabbed the plaintiff’s shoulder, pulled her face toward the surgical opening, and exchanged demeaning words?

Key Facts: Dr. Turk was performing a gall bladder surgery which did not go well.  The defendant was frustrated with the operation itself and the plaintiff, who was a scrub nurse in the operating room. The defendant became exasperated because the plaintiff was making mistakes. The defendant grabbed her shoulder and pulled her face down toward the surgical opening, saying, “Can’t you see where I’m working? I’m working in a hole. I need long instruments.”

Procedural History: The trial court ruled that no battery was committed because there was an absence of evidence that he intended to inflict personal injury. Plaintiff appealed.

Holding: Dr. Turk committed an offensive contact and, in turn, battery.

Reasoning: Using a reasonable-minds test, we can conclude that Dr. Turk intended to commit an offensive contact. Ask: “Did Dr. Turk’s action constitute an offensive contact to a reasonable person?”

Judgment: The first assignment of error was sustained.