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Wana the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc. – 180 Cal. Rptr. 423

Case Name: Wana the Bear v. Community Construction, Inc.
Plaintiff: Wana the Bear
Defendant: Community Construction, Inc.
Citation: 180 Cal. Rptr. 423

Issue: Whether the burial ground, which was excavated by the defendant, achieved a protectable status as a public cemetery under the 1872 cemetery law by virtue as its prior stats as a public graveyard.

Key Facts: The defendant excavated a property to develop a residential community. The property had been used by the Miwok Indians between 1850 and 1870 before they were driven out. The property was known to be a burial ground and has been the subject of numerous archeological studies. The plaintiff brought an action to stop the defendant from excavating after uncovering many of the bodies.
A 1854 act held that a place where six bodies were buried constituted a “public graveyard.” In 1872, a new act added a prescriptive clause that required the land be “used as a public cemetery continuously, without interruption, as a burial ground for five years.” It further declared that “no part of the code was retroactive unless expressly declared.” The Miwoks were no longer using the burial ground in 1873, therefore it was not made a burial ground under this new code.

Holding: The burial ground did not achieve a protectable status as a public cemetery.

Judgment: Affirmed the lower court and did not stop further excavation.

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In the Matter of Baby M – 109 N.J. 396 (1988)

Case Name: In the Matter of Baby M
Citation: 109 N.J. 396; 537 A.2d 1227; 1988

Issue: Whether the plaintiff could enforce a surrogacy contract which terminated the parental rights of the defendant mother and awarded sole custody to plaintiff father.

Procedural History: Defendant surrogate mother challenged the order of the Superior Court (New Jersey) that enforced the terms of a surrogate parent contract on behalf of plaintiff father. Defendant claimed that the surrogacy contract was invalid; that the trial court improperly terminated her parental rights and awarded sole custody to plaintiff father, and improperly allowed the adoption of the child by plaintiff’s wife, all pursuant to the terms of the contract.

Key Facts: On direct certification from the trial court, the court reversed the order that terminated defendant surrogate mother’s parental rights, restored her as the mother of the child, and invalidated the surrogacy contract entered into between plaintiff father and defendant. The court ruled that the contract was invalid as a matter of law, because it violated statute and was against public policy. The court found that private placement adoption was disfavored, that the payment of money made the contract illegal and possibly criminal under N.J. Stat. Ann. 9:3-54, and that it was vested with an element of coercion. The court ruled that the agreement was totally unenforceable. The court determined that the statute required a surrender of the child to a public agency and then a termination proceeding, which could only proceed after counseling. The court held that the termination of defendant’s parental rights called for by the surrogacy contract and ordered by the trial court, failed to comply with statutory requirements. The court ruled that no one can contractually abandon one’s parental rights. The court held that because the termination was invalid, the adoption was invalid.

Holding: The court invalidated the surrogacy contract because it conflicted with the law and public policy of the state.

Judgment: The court granted custody to plaintiff father, voided both the termination of the surrogate mother’s parental rights and the adoption of the child by plaintiff’s wife, and restored defendant surrogate mother as the mother of the child. The court remanded the case on the issue of visitation only.

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Charrier v. Bell – 496 So. 2d 601

Case Name: Charrier v. Bell
Plaintiff: Charrier
Defendant: Bell
Citation: 496 So. 2d 601

Issue: Whether the plaintiff was the owner of the artifacts which he excavated from burial sites on land that was owned by other nonresidents.

Key Facts: The plaintiff, an “amateur archeologist,” excavated 150 burial sites and other artifacts over the course of three years. He obtained consent of the caretaker of the plantation but did not obtained consent from the landowners. He sought to sell the artifacts he excavated but buyers would not purchase until he could prove he had title.

Procedural History: The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment against the six nonresident landowners of the Trudeau Plantation confirming that he was the owner of the artifacts. The trial court found for the defendant.

Reasoning: The intent of those burying the people was not to abandon the artifacts.

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Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co. – 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948)

Case Name: Eliff v. Texon Drilling Co.
Plaintiff: Eliff
Defendant: Texon Drilling Co.
Citation: 210 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. 1948)

Issue: Whether under the law of capture the plaintiff can recover for the damages resulting from the wrongful drainage of the gas from beneath their land.

Key Facts: The landowners owned the surface and certain royalty interest of land upon which a producing well was located, as well as the mineral estate underlying the land. While the oil companies were engaged in drilling an offset well, the offset well blew out, caught fire, and cratered. The blowout resulted in the destruction of the landowners’ well and drained large quantities of gas and distillate from under their land. The landowners filed suit.

Applicable Law: In Texas, the landowner is regarded as having absolute title in severalty to the oil and gas in place beneath the land. However, this law must be in connection with the law of capture and is subject to police regulations. Scientific research has determined that oil and gas will migrate across property lines towards any low pressure area created by production from the common pool.

This migratory character of oil and gas has given rise to the so-called rule or law of capture. That rule simply is that the owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil or gas which he produces from wells on his land, though part of the oil or gas may have migrated from adjoining lands. He does not need consent and does not incur liability. The nonliability is based upon the theory that after the drainage the title or property interest of the former owned is gone. Each owner whose land overlies the basin has a like interest, and each must of necessity exercise his right with some regard to the rights of others. No owner should be permitted to carry on his operations in reckless or lawless irresponsibility, but must submit to such limitations as are necessary to enable each to get his own.

The court did not think the non-liability rule should apply to negligent waste and destruction of the oil.

Procedural Posture: Petitioner land owners appealed the judgment of the Court of Civil Appeals (Texas), which reversed the trial court’s judgment for the land owners in their action to recover damages resulting from a blowout of a gas well drilled by respondent oil companies.

Overview: The trial court entered judgment for the landowners. The appellate court reversed the judgment, and this appeal followed. The court reversed the appellate court’s judgment. The appellate court was without authority to pass upon the propriety of the measure of damages adopted by the trial court because no such assignment was presented to it. The law of capture did not absolve the oil companies from liability because the negligent waste and destruction of the landowners’ gas and distillate was neither a legitimate drainage nor a lawful or reasonable appropriation of them. Under the common law, the oil companies were legally bound to use due care to avoid the negligent waste or destruction of the minerals, and they failed to discharge this duty.

Judgment: The court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, and the case was remanded to the appellate court for further proceedings.

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Popov v. Hayashi – 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002)

Case Name: Popov v. Hayashi
Plaintiff: Popov
Defendant: Hayashi
Citation: 2002 WL 31833731 (Cal. Super. Ct. 2002)

Issue: Whether the defendant is liable for conversion when he picked up the home run ball that was dropped by the plaintiff.

Key Facts: Barry Bonds 73rd Homerun. The plaintiff caught the ball in the upper portion of his glove but was tackled and thrown to the ground by the crowd. The ball fell out and the defendant picked it up and put it in his pocket. The plaintiff sued for conversion.

Holding: The plaintiff and defendant had equitable claims and could not prove their case either way.

Reasoning: Although the plaintiff proved intent to possess the ball, he could not establish that he would have fully possessed the ball had he not been tackled by the crowd. If he could have established this, his pre-possessory interest would have constituted a qualified right to possession which can support a cause of action for conversion.

Judgment: The ball was sold for $450,000 and the proceeds were divided equally.

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Pierson v. Post – 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805)

Case Name: Pierson v. Post
Plaintiff/Appellee: Post
Defendant/Appellant: Pierson
Citation: 2 Am. Dec. 264 (N.Y. 1805)

Issue: Whether a trespass was committed when Pierson killed and carried off the fox that was being hunted by Post.

Key Facts: Post was hunting a fox with dogs and hounds and while he was hunting the fox, Pierson, who knew that Post was hunting, killed and carried off the fox.

Procedural History: The first court found for the plaintiff, Post.

Holding: A trespass was not committed although the conduct of Pierson was uncourteous towards Post, his act did not produce an injury or damage for which a legal remedy can be applied.

Reasoning: Based off Barbeyrac, the actual bodily seizure is not necessary constitute possession of wild animals; however, pursuit alone is insufficient to constitute possession.

Judgment: The second court reversed the decision.

Dissent: The dissenting opinion stated that property in animals may be acquired without bodily touch or manucaption, provided the pursuer be within reach, or have a reasonable prospect of taking, what he has thus discovered an intention of converting to his own use.

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Willcox v. Stroup – 467 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2006)

Case Name: Willcox v. Stroup
Plaintiff: Thomas Law Willcox
Defendant: Stroup (Director of the SC Department of Archives/History and the State of South Carolina
Citation: 467 F.3d 409 (4th Cir. 2006)

Issue: Whether the plaintiff had good title of the Civil War documents when they had been in his family’s possession for over one hundred and forty years and there was no evidence that showed any other had title to the property.

Key Facts: The plaintiff found 444 documents from the administrations of two governors of South Carolina during the Civil War in a shopping bag in his late stepmother’s home. The documents have an appraised value of $2.4 million. The plaintiff allowed the documents to be microfilmed for the state archives. When the plaintiff attempted to sell the papers, the defendant obtained a temporary restraining order preventing the sale. The plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that he owned the papers.

Reasoning: If there is no evidence to the contrary, proof of possession, is sufficient proof of title.

Rule of Law: Proof of possession is sufficient proof of title if there is no evidence to the contrary.

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International News Service v. Associated Press – 248 U.S. 215 (1918)

Case Name: International News Service v. Associated Press
Plaintiff: Associated Press
Defendant: International News Service
Citation: 248 U.S. 215 (1918)

Issue: Whether the plaintiff has a property right in the information it gathered for news.

Key Facts: INS was obtaining news that was gathered by the AP through public bulletin boards and early edition newspapers and then reproducing the news in their members’ newspapers without giving credit to the AP. Plaintiff contended that defendant’s practice constitutes unfair competition.
The AP contended that the news they gathered is property, because it costs money and labor to produce and because it has value for exchange. Also this news remains property and is entitled to protection as long as it has commercial value as news. The AP desired that the INS not be able to make any gainful use of their news while it retained its value as news.

Holding: Plaintiff does have a property right but it is limited and extends only against competitors in the news business.

Reasoning: Title to property is not absolute but relative. Because the news has “exchange value” based on its novelty and freshness, it should be protected as a property right with rules against misappropriation by a competitor.

Dissent: The dissenting opinion (Brandeis) did not believe news constituted property that could be protected. Also, that the defendant’s practices did not constitute unfair competition in the legal sense because the legal sense only addresses fraud or  force or doing of acts otherwise prohibited by law. The gathering of news by purchasing papers in the open market or from public bulletins did not involve breach of contract, fraud, or force. Also, the INS was under no contractual obligation to disclose the source of news and no law because the material was uncopyrighted.

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Uston v Resorts International Hotel, Inc. – 445 A.2d 370 (1982)

Case Name: Uston v Resorts International Hotel, Inc.
Citation: 445 A.2d 370 (1982)
Plaintiff: Uston
Defendant: Resorts International Hotel, Inc.

Key Facts: Defendant was excluded Uston from the blackjack tables in its casino because Uston uses a card counting strategy which allegedly increases his chances of winning money. His strategy does not violate the Casino Control Commission.

Issue: Does the right of reasonable access apply to all businesses that are open to the public?

Holding: Uston possesses the right of reasonable access to the blackjack’s tables; unless there is a valid rule by the Commission that would state otherwise.

Reasoning: Uston does not threaten the security of the casino nor has he disrupted its functions and there is no common or statutory law that could exclude him because of his strategy to play blackjack.
“The more private property is dedicated to public use, the more it must accommodate the rights which inhere in individual members of the general public who use that property.” State v. Schmid. Schmid involved the constitutional right to distribute literature on a private university campus. The court decided that when property owners open up their property to the general public, for their own private property interests, they have no right to exclude people unreasonably.
The traditional common law right of reasonable access had only applied to innkeepers and common carriers (planes, trains, buses). Uston extended that law to all businesses open to the public.

Judgment: Uston was allowed use of the blackjack tables.

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Glavin v Eckman – 881 N.E. 2d 820

Case Name: Glavin v Eckman
Citation:  881 N.E. 2d 820 (Mass. App. Ct. 2008)
Plaintiff: James A. Glavin
Defendant: Bruce and Shelly Eckman; Jon R. Fragosa

Issue: Whether the judge erred in permitting the jury to award a restoration cost measure of damages, rather than damages measured by the value of the timber wrongfully cut, or by the diminutive market value.

Key Facts: The defendants (Eckmans) hired an independent contractor (Fragosa) to cut down ten oak trees that were on the property the plaintiff (Glavin) , without his permission, in order to enhance their view. Glavin had previously been asked by Eckman to have this done but refused to and stated that he planned to use the ten oak trees as shade for a pond which he planned to restore.

Procedural History: The jury awarded Glavin $30,000 to restore his land. They found that both Eckman and Fragosa were at fault.

Holding: According to Mass. Gen Law statute, Glavin was able to opt for the value of the timber cut or the diminutive value of his property as the measure of damages. However, if this does not meet the value of the damages, he may opt for restorative damages.

Reasoning: Glavin was not planning on selling the land so diminutive market value should not be the main measure of damages. The trees had significant value to Glavin. Direct restoration may be physically impossible or disproportionally expensive that it be unreasonable to do so.

Judgment: The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s award to Glavin of $30,000.