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United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (1976)

Case Name: United States v. Jewell
Citation: 532 F.2d 697 (1976)

Facts: Jewell was convicted of knowingly transporting marijuana in his car from Mexico. The pot was hidden in a secret compartment behind the rear seat. There was evidence that Jewell deliberately avoided positive knowledge in order to avoid responsibility  (“Willful Blindness”). The trial court judge gave a jury instruction that defendant is guilty if the government shows, beyond a reasonable doubt, that (even though he was not actually aware) his ignorance was solely because he made a conscious purpose to disregard what was in the vehicle to avoid learning the truth.

Defendant’s argument: The state needs to prove that Jewell knowingly brought and possessed the marijuana into the US. The MPC requires the state to prove that the defendant is “aware of a high probability of its existence.”

State’s argument: Jewell interprets “knowingly” to narrow and is not consistent with the purpose of the Drug Control Act. A narrow interpretation would allow deliberate ignorance as a defense.

Holding: Upheld the judge’s instruction and the defendant’s conviction.

Dissent: Three errors in the jury instruction:

  1. The MPC gives a definition of knowledge not an alternative for it (mentions a gift to child)
  2. Did not alert the jury that he could not be convicted if he “actually believed” there was no controlled substance in the car
  3. The instruction clearly stated that the defendant could have been convicted even if found ignorant or “not actually aware” that the car contained a controlled substance
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Regina v. Cunningham, 2 QB. 396 (1957)

Case Name: Regina v. Cunningham
Citation: 2 QB. 396 (1957)

Facts: Regina stole a gas meter from the gas pipes of a home and the gas leaked into the house and partially asphyxiated his future mother-in-law who was sleeping. He served six months for stealing the gas meter and was convicted for “unlawfully and maliciously” endangering another by exposing them to a noxious substance.

Defendant’s argument: No mens rea existed. Also, Regina must have intended to do the harm or that he must foresee the harm and recklessly act. Finally, the judge stated that “malicious” means the same as “wicked” and he found this fact for the jury.

State’s argument: Malice either requires (1) an actual intention to do the particular kind of harm that in fact was done; or (2) recklessness as to whether such harm should occur or not. Malice does not require any ill will towards the person injured. Malice postulates “foresight of consequence.”

Holding: Conviction quashed. It should have been left to the jury to decide whether the defendant foresaw that his action might cause injury to someone.

Reasoning: The trial court judge equated malicious with wicked. He implied that if the jury found the Regina’s act of stealing the gas meter “wicked” then the jury should find Regina maliciously caused that harm.

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Pope v. State, 284 Md. 309 (1979)

Case Name: Pope v. State
Citation: 284 Md. 309 (1979)

Facts: Pope was convicted after standing by while a mother beat her child to death in the defendant’s home. The mother had claimed she was God and that Satan had hidden himself inside the body of her child.

Defendant’s argument:  Pope did not have a legal duty (as opposed to a moral one). Also, because the mother was present, Pope could not have assumed responsibility for the supervision of the child.

State’s argument: Pope invited the woman and child into her home and fed them. This is assuming responsibility for both of them, especially after the child was in need of medical attention. In the alternative, there is a common law charge for “misprision of felony.”

Holding: Pope did not have a legal duty and should not be punished for not fulfilling a moral obligation. Also, the common law charge is too broad, has not been used for a long time, and is incompatible with our current laws.

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Jones v. United States, 308 F.2d 307 (1962)

Case Name: Jones v. United States
Citation: 308 F.2d 307 (1962)

Facts: Jones was found guilty of involuntary manslaughter for failing to provide for a 10 month old child of her friend.

Defendant’s argument: There must be a finding that the defendant had a legal duty (not just a moral one) in order to be charged with involuntary manslaughter.

State’s argument: Jones assumed a contractual duty to care for the baby or voluntarily assumed the care of another and secluded the baby to prevent others from rendering aid.

Holding: Jones did not have a duty for the baby.

Reasoning: There was conflicting evidence as to whether or not the defendant was paid which would have made a contractual duty.

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Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11 (2003)

Case Name: Ewing v. California
Citation: 538 U.S. 11 (2003)

Facts: The goal of the “Three Strikes and You’re Out” law was to protect public safety by providing lengthy prison terms for habitual offers. Ewing had a record (mostly theft and battery – at least two serious or violent crimes) and was being sentenced for stealing about $1,200 worth of golf clubs. The judge had some discretion whether or not to sentence under Three Strikes but refused and sentenced Ewing to 25 years to life.

Issue: Whether the 8th Amendment prohibits the State of California from sentencing a repeat felon to a prison term of 25 years to life under the State’s “Three Strikes and You’re Out.”

Defendant’s argument: Ewing’s 25 years to life sentence is disproportionate and is cruel and unusual punishment for theft charges. It does not match up with “the gravity of the offense and the harshness of the penalty.”

State’s argument: This law targets the class of offenders who pose the greatest threat to public safety: career criminals. Also, statistics showed that the new law seemed to deter crime because the recidivism rate went down.

Holding: The sentence was affirmed.

Reasoning: Deference to the legislature – it is a legislative judgment that offenders who continue to commit violent or serious crimes be incapacitated. Spoke about the cruel and unusual clause contains a “Narrow proportionality principle” that “applies to noncapital sentences.”

Scalia’s concurrence in judgment: Proportionality should only be tied to capital offenses. The plurality is evaluating policy (making it more difficult than it has to be).

Thomas’ concurrence in the judgment: 8th Amendment contains no proportionality principle

Dissent: Proportionality is required by the 8th Amendment.

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City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41 (1999)

Case Name: City of Chicago v. Morales
Citation: 527 U.S. 41 (1999)

Facts: Chicago enacted the Gang Congregation Ordinance prohibiting “criminal street gang members” from “loitering” with one another in any public case.

The offense required four predicates:

  1. Police officer must reasonably believe that at least one of the people is a criminal street gang member
  2. The people must be “loitering” – defined as – “remaining in any  one place with no apparent purpose”
  3. The officer must order all of the people to disperse and remove themselves from the area
  4. A person must disobey the officer’s order

Issue: Whether the ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment

City’s argument: The person receives adequate notice once the officer tells him to disperse. Also, crime went down when the ordinance was enacted (footnote). Police officers need discretion.

Defendant’s argument: The ordinance is so vague and it leaves the “public uncertain as to the conduct it prohibits.” (See example of drug dealing basketball players in footnote). An officer’s order cannot retroactively give adequate warning of the boundary between the permissible and the impermissible applications of the law. The ordinance has an overall lack of clarity and there are no guidelines for law enforcement as the ordinance gives them absolute discretion.

Holding: The city’s ordinance affords too much discretion to the police and too little notice to citizens.

Concurrence: Apparent purpose – needs a standard to go along with it

Dissent: Police/peace officers have always had discretion and have always performed the duty of preventing loitering (“move along” he calls it). Also, the majority underestimates the intelligence of the people of Chicago and whether or not they will know if the public perceives them as having no apparent purpose.

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Keeler v. Superior Court, 2 Cal. 3d 619 (1970)

Case Name: Keeler v. Superior Court
Citation: 2 Cal. 3d 619 (1970)

Facts: Keeler kneed his wife in the stomach to purposefully kill her fetus.

Issue: Whether the fetus, which would have been viable outside the womb, can be considered a “human being” for purposes of the California Penal Code.

Defendant’s argument: A fetus does not fall within the meaning of a “human being” when looking at legislative history. Furthermore:
1) The power to define a crime is a legislative function (the court exercised judicial enlargement which is a violation of the separation of powers), and
2) Due Process requires a fair warning and the government cannot enact an ex post facto law
– It is “unforeseeable” to consider a fetus a human being

State’s argument: The fetus was viable outside of the womb and should be considered a “human being” and it is within the judicial interpretation power to state this.

Holding: The judicial enlargement of the criminal statute was not foreseeable by the defendant and “its adoption at this time would deny him due process of law.” We require more specificity when you are at risk of losing your personal liberty.

Dissent: We should interpret the term “human being” with today’s medical science. The legislature used a broad term, “human being,” (as opposed to “one who has been born alive”). Also, the fact that California courts have not had this same question does not render the judgment “unforeseeable.”

 

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McBoyle v. United States, 283 U.S. 25 (1931)

Case Name: McBoyle v. United States
Citation: 283 U.S. 25 (1931)

Facts: McBoyle was convicted of knowingly transporting a stolen aircraft in interstate commerce.

Issue: Whether the term “vehicle” in the NMVTA applies to aircraft.

Defendant’s argument: The definition of “vehicle” in the act specifies many land vehicles but does not mention anything about aircraft. There is nothing in the legislative history that mentioned aircraft.

State’s argument: The definition includes “any other self-propelled vehicle not designed for running on rails.” An aircraft meets this definition.

Court’s reasoning: Although a criminal is not likely to carefully consider the text of the law before committing a crime, the law should give reasonable fair warning (notice) and be written in language that the common world will understand. In everyday speech, the term “vehicle” conjures up the “picture of a thing moving on land.” Also, the definitions only list motor vehicles that move on land.

Judgment: Reversed.

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Commonwealth v. Mochan, 177 Pa. Super. 454 (1955)

Case Name: Commonwealth v. Mochan
Citation: 177 Pa. Super. 454 (1955)

Facts: Mochan was indicted for making numerous harassing phone calls to a woman. He was convicted of a misdemeanor under common law because his act was not a criminal offense under any Pennsylvania statute.

Issue: Whether the court can convict a defendant under common law when his actions did not constitute a criminal offense under state statute.

Defendant’s argument: nulla poena sine lege – no punishment without law. The defendant argues that he cannot be convicted of an action that is not illegal.

State’s argument: The state’s common law is sufficiently broad to allow a court to act and declares that “whatever openly outrages decency and is injurious to public morals is a misdemeanor at common law.” The defendant’s actions fit this criterion; therefore, the court can charge and convict him of a misdemeanor.

Court’s reasoning: The question is whether the alleged crimes could have been prosecuted and punished under common law. Because the controlling principles are broad, “[a]ny act is indictable at common law which from its nature scandalously affects the morals or health of the community…”

Holding: The charges correctly identified the offense as a common law misdemeanor.

Dissent: This allows the courts to supersede the legislature’s power. Although common law is part of the state’s law, our country has had 200 years of the legislative branch determining which actions require punishment. This is a slippery slope as “there is nothing to prevent our invasion of the legislative field except our own self restraint.”

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United States v. Gementera, 379 F.3d 596 (2004)

Case Name: United States v. Gementera
Citation: 379 F.3d 596 (2004)

Facts: Gementera stole mail and plead guilty to mail theft. He had a long criminal history for a twenty-four year old. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommended a two to eight month incarceration. The judge sentencedGementera to two months incarceration and three years supervised release. One of the conditions of the release was 100 hours of community service that would consist of standing in front of a post office with a sandwich board that state “I stole mail. This is my punishment.” After another hearing, other options were added for the community service (i.e. writing apology letters and speaking at local schools) and the sandwich board activity was diminished to one day of eight hours.

Issue: Whether a punishment that shames or humiliates serves a legitimate objective and is reasonably related to the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.

Defendant’s argument: The punishment was meant for the impermissible purpose of humiliation; in violation of a federal statute. Also, that the humiliation was not “reasonably related” to rehabilitation.

State’s argument: The humiliation was not an “ends” in itself but a “means” to the legitimate objective for the defendant to understand the seriousness of his crime (that it was not a victimless crime). It is also reasonably related to offense and the history of the defendant.

Court’s reasoning: The district court seemed to think that the defendant did not understand the seriousness of his crime. There is still academic debate whether “shaming” works to rehabilitate the criminal and prevent others from committing a crime as opposed to recidivism.  The district court did not have to display scientific evidence that this type of punishment was effective.

Holding: The condition was reasonably related to the statutory objective of rehabilitation.

Dissent: The sandwich board condition violates the Sentencing Reform Act. Furthermore, this “shaming” goes to dehumanize the defendant not rehabilitate. Affirming the condition “recalls a time in our history when pillories and stocks were the order of the day.”